Direct Recording Electronic voting machines (DRE’s), also known as touchscreens, are a more accurate, less expensive and empowering alternative than previous systems employing paper. According to a voting specialist at University of California Berkeley, they are five times more accurate than punch cards, three times more accurate than mechanical lever systems, and twice as accurate as optical scan systems. The 2000 Presidential election was determined by 537 votes; more than 2 million votes went uncounted in this election because of paper-based voting systems. Votes don’t get counted when paper ballots are marked incorrectly--DRE’s eliminate most of the errors.
DRE’s are accessible to American citizens that are disenfranchised using paper systems. Someone who is blind or has low vision is able to cast a secret, independent vote using headphones and verbal instructions (10 million Americans). Someone who has mobility access disabilities is able to cast a ballot using adaptive devices to make an elective choice and vote (1.4 million Americans). Someone who has a low reading comprehension is able to vote independently using headphones with verbal instructions (37 million Americans). And someone who is a non-English speaking American is able to vote by reading or listening to voting instructions in their native tongue (33 million Americans).
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) requires at least 1 accessible voting machine in every polling place by January 1, 2006. Nearly every state has been stalled in its pursuit of this legislative requirement by the voter verified paper ballot (VVPB) controversy. Allegations of fraud and security issues have been overstated by people who have either not made the effort to understand, or have chosen to ignore, the performance standards for voting machines and systems of the Federal Election Commission. There are no existing standards for a VVPB. Establishing new standards requires years of testing, verification and analysis to establish new certifications and this critical process hasn’t even started. Even if Congress were to require a VVPB, the machine itself violates federal standards. By the time all of the certification issues have been resolved (how heavy should the paper be, how will it be stored, what kind of printer will be used, what kind of ink, what is an acceptable breakdown rate, etc.) the effective date of January 1, 2006 for HAVA’s access rights will have passed.
Considering that the overwhelming majority of documented election fraud involved paper, why should we add paper to the system? There are better ways to provide security for DRE’s. Among them are continuing the practice of keeping voting systems offline, mandatory use of federally certified voting systems, clear procedures of polling place operations, restrictions on physical access to voting equipment, development and enforcement of statewide security plans, and third party electronic verification to allow review of ballots on third party software.
AAPD joins with the League of Women Voters, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, the Consortium of Citizens with Disabilities and other voting rights organizations to oppose a VVPB because the concept discriminates against Americans with disabilities, Americans who have low reading comprehension, and low English proficiency Americans. AAPD will not support an initiative that will take away the rights of citizens whose numbers approach 100 million. Will you?